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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Bates argued, among other things, that the district
court erred when it denied her motion for the appointment of substitute counsel. This
brief is necessary to address several of the State's arguments, including but not limited
to, its argument that Ms. Bates did not file a motion for substitute counsel and that she
has no right to counsel in regard to her post-judgment motion to withdraw her guilty
plea.

Ms. Bates argues that she clearly requested the appointment of substitute

counsel when she wrote in her motion to withdraw her guilty plea "Motion of new
counsel." Ms. Bates also argues that Idaho case law establishes a statutory right to
counsel which is co-extensive with a Sixth Amendment right to counsel during postjudgment proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Ms. Bates' Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Bates' motion for the appointment of
new counsel to represent her in regard to her motion to withdraw her guilty
plea? 1

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Bates' motion to
withdraw her guilty plea?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified life sentence,
with thirty years fixed, upon Ms. Bates following her plea of guilty to second
degree murder?

4.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Bates' Rule 35
motion requesting leniency?

1

Ms. Bates will only address Issue I in this Reply Brief.

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Bates' Motion For The Appointment Of
New Counsel To Represent Her In Regard To Her Motion To Withdraw Her Guilty Plea
The State opens its Reply Brief by arguing that Ms. Bates did not request
substitute counsel in regard to her motion to withdraw her guilty plea, and, based on
that premise, it argues that Ms. Bates failed to meet the fundamental error standard
espoused by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010).
(Respondent's Brief, pp.4-8.) The State's argument is not supported by the record, as it
completely disregards the language employed by Ms. Bates in her motion to withdraw
her guilty plea. In the affidavit Ms. Bates filed in support of her motion to withdraw her
guilty plea, she wrote the following:
I was persistently forced in to signing I was tricked by only reading
last page last signing after just haven read a continue 2 second x second
day of meeting, for a more time to come up with money for trial
Not properly investigated knowledge with held knowledge of others
confession and explanasion the cover up
Motion of new counsel
(Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) (07/08/13
Augmentation), p.1 (bold emphasis added).)

Contrary to the State's assertion,

Ms. Bates was clearly requesting "new counsel" in regard to her motion to withdraw her
guilty plea. While the State makes a blanket statement that Ms. Bates never requested
substitute counsel, it fails to provide an alternative meaning for the phrase "Motion of
new counsel." The State's attempt to argue that Ms. Bates did not request substitute
counsel constitutes a blatant disregard for the record. As such, the Perry fundamental
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error standard is not relevant to this issue, as Ms. Bates' request for the appointment of
substitute counsel was clearly preserved for appellate review.
The State next argues, in passing, that the request for the appointment of
substitute counsel was not preserved for appeal because district court did not enter an
adverse ruling on that request.

(Respondent's Brief, p.4.)

Contrary to the State's

assertion, the request for the appointment of substitute counsel was a subcomponent of
Ms. Bates' motion to withdraw her guilty plea, which was denied in the district court's
May 29, 2013, order. (Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty
(07/08/13 Augmentation), pp.1-2.)
The State then argues that Ms. Bates has no Sixth Amendment right to counsel
in regard to her motion to withdraw her guilty plea and, therefore, the district court had
no duty to inquire into her request for the appointment of substitute counsel.
(Respondent's Brief, p.5.)

In support of this position, the State relies on State v.

Hartshorn, 149 Idaho 454 (Ct. App. 2010), where the Court of Appeals held that a postjudgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not a "critical stage" for purposes of the
Sixth Amendment and, as such, a defendant has no constitutional right to an attorney to
pursue such a motion. (Respondent's Brief, p.5.) The State's reliance on Hartshorn is
misplaced because it ignores a critical distinction highlighted in that Opinion.
Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that Hartshorn only raised a Sixth Amendment
right to counsel claim and did not raise a statutory right to counsel claim pursuant to
I.C. § 19-852(b). Hartshorn, 149 Idaho at 457-458 n.2. As such, that Opinion did not
address Hartshorn's statutory right to counsel under I.C. § 19-852. Since Ms. Bates has
raised her right to counsel under both the Sixth Amendment and under I.C. § 19-852(b)
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(Appellant's Brief, p.4 ), the Hartshorn Opinion is not controlling. Moreover, Hartshorn
provides very little guidance, if any, in this matter because of the Idaho Supreme Court's
insistence that I.C. § 19-852's "statutory right to counsel would be a hollow right if it did
not guarantee the defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel." Hernandez v.
State, 127 Idaho 685, 687 (1995). The Hernandez Court went on to hold that, "We can

see no legitimate basis for determining whether there has been a violation of the right to
effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by I.C. § 19-852 differently from determining
whether there has been a violation of a similar constitutional right." Id.
The State then argues that the appointment of substitute counsel is discretionary
and, as such, the district court had no "statutory duty of inquiry." (Respondent's Brief,
p.5 n.1.) The State cites to Murphy v. State, 2014 Opinion No.24 (Feb. 25, 2014) (not
yet final), for the proposition that when the district court has the discretion to appoint
counsel there is no constitutionally protected right to counsel after a discretionary
appointment has been made. (Respondent's Brief, p.5 n.1.) The State's reliance on
Murphy is misplaced because that case dealt with post-conviction proceedings under

the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (hereinafter, UPCA), I.C. § 19-4901 et seq.,
and this case deals with a post-judgment motion in the direct criminal proceedings. This
distinction is important because a post-conviction action pursuant to the UPCA is
deemed a civil action which is a true collateral attack on the defendant's conviction. For
example, in Murphy, the Idaho Supreme Court relied on Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481
U.S. 551 (1987), where the Finley court held:
Postconviction relief is even further removed from the criminal trial than is
discretionary direct review. It is not part of the criminal proceeding itself,
and it is in fact considered to be civil in nature. It is a collateral attack that
normally occurs only after the defendant has failed to secure relief through
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direct review of his conviction. States have no obligation to provide this
avenue of relief, and when they do, the fundamental fairness mandated by
the Due Process Clause does not require that the State supply a lawyer
as well.
Id. at 556-557 (internal citations omitted).

Thus, in Finley, the Court was not

considering an application of a Sixth Amendment right to counsel or a co-extensive
statutory right to counsel; rather, it was concerned with the question of whether a postconviction petitioner has a Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel in a collateral attack
on a conviction. As such, Murphy is inapposite because that Opinion was dealing with
different proceedings and different rights than those at issue in this matter.
Additionally, the primary policy rationales behind the holding in Murphy, i.e.
judicial economy and finality of judgments, are not applicable in the context of
Ms. Bates' motion to withdraw her guilty plea.

In Murphy, the Idaho Supreme Court

overruled Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591 ( 1981 ), where it had been held that a UPCA
petitioner could file a successive petition on the basis that his/her post-conviction
counsel was ineffective. Murphy, at 5-8. In doing so, the Idaho Supreme Court cited to
Bejarano v. Warden, 929 P.2d 922, 925 (Nev. 1996), for the proposition that the ability
to file successive post-conviction petitions has allowed post-conviction petitioners to
make "a sham out of the system of justice and thwarted imposition of their ultimate
penalty with continuous petitions for relief," and, due to this problem, the State "cannot
guarantee every defendant effective counsel for every claim that may be raised." Id. at
8. These concerns are not triggered by the post-judgment motion at issue in this case,
because motions to withdraw guilty pleas cannot be filed ad infinitum. If a defendant
files a motion to withdraw his/her guilty plea in a direct criminal case, the defendant
cannot raise the same claim in post-conviction proceedings.
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Banuelos v. State, 127

Idaho 860, 863 (Ct. App. 1995). Moreover, a district court loses jurisdiction to entertain
a motion to withdraw a guilty plea "once the judgment becomes final, either by
expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the judgment on appeal." State v.
Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 354 (2003).
Additionally, the State does not address the grave policy implications of
extending the holding to Murphy to post-judgment motions.

The ultimate holding in

Murphy is that a post-conviction petitioner has no right to effective assistance of counsel

during post-conviction proceedings.

If that holding is extended to post-judgment

motions, then criminal defendants have no right to either effective assistance of counsel
or the corollary right to conflict free counsel during post-judgment criminal proceedings.
Regardless of whether counsel was appointed as a matter of right or in an exercise of
the district court's discretion, the lay petitioner should be able to rely upon the
competence of his/her attorney. And when a defendant relies upon that attorney to the
defendant's own detriment, it is patently unfair to penalize the defendant for counsel's
errors-regardless of the reason why the attorney was appointed in the first instance.
Further, as in this case, it is exceptionally unreasonable to hold that Ms. Bates should
not be able to rely on her counsel because she had the same attorney throughout the
entirety of the criminal proceedings.

Ms. Bates cannot fathom why she should stop

trusting her attorney after the judgment of conviction has been entered.

This

undermines the credibility of the Idaho State Bar and the legal profession as a whole. It
is also inconsistent with the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. As such, it would be
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unwise to hold that there is no right to effective assistance of counsel in regard to postjudgment motions. 2
The State next argues that the district court had no duty to inquire into Ms. Bates'
request for the appointment of substitute counsel because the basis for that request
was vague. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-8.) The State relies on Hall v. State, 155 Idaho
610 (2013), for the proposition that a district court does not have a duty to inquire into a
potential conflict of interest when the there is only a vague possibility that a conflict of
interest exists.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.7-8.) The State's reliance on Hall is entirely

misplaced because Hall addresses a different duty of inquiry than the one addressed by
Ms. Bates in her Appellant's Brief. Specifically, Hall addresses the requirement that a
court inquire sua sponte into a potential conflict of interest when the court knows "or
reasonably should know that a potential conflict of interest exists." 3 State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 60 (2003); see also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980).

If there is no right to counsel during post-judgment proceedings, then appointed
counsel could actively argue against the client during those proceedings. In the event
this occurs, the defendant would be left with no remedy other than filing a bar complaint
or suing the attorney for malpractice, which is a course of action that one judge from the
Idaho Court of Appeals has previously frowned upon. See Mellinger v. State, 113 Idaho
31, 35 (Ct. App. 1987) (Burnett, J., concurring) ("If he is denied effective assistance of
counsel, and as a result he inadequately raises grounds for relief in his application to
the court, he may file a subsequent application reasserting the grounds more fully. See
I.C. § 19-4908. Thus, if a prisoner filed a timely application but it was dismissed due to
ineffective assistance of counsel, I believe the prisoner would be entitled to file a
subsequent application asserting his grounds for relief more fully even though the fiveyear period of limitation under I.C. § 19-4902 had elapsed in the meantime. To hold
otherwise would leave the prisoner with no alternative than to sue the attorney for
malpractice-a distasteful and onerous undertaking-or to seek a writ of habeas corpus
from a federal court, producing the very kind of outside interference in state judicial
rrocesses that the Post-Conviction Procedure Act was intended to avoid.").
A classic example of this type of conflict occurs when one attorney represents multiple
criminal defendants. This type of representation will usually trigger a court's duty to
affirmatively inquire into the potential conflict of interest because criminal codefendant's
2
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An entirely different duty, which is found in a separate line of cases, is triggered
when a defendant affirmatively requests the appointment of substitute counsel.
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 703-704 n.9 (2009) (holding that when a defendant

affirmatively requests substitute counsel "a separate and distinct obligation" to inquire is
triggered and the standards espoused in Cuyler are not applicable). When a defendant
requests substitute counsel a mandatory duty to inquire is triggered and must be
undertaken "[e]ven when the trial court suspects that the defendant's requests are
disingenuous and designed solely to manipulate the judicial process and to delay the
trial, perfunctory questioning is not sufficient."

State v. Lippert, 152 Idaho 884, 887

(Ct. App. 2012). As stated above, the affirmative duty to inquire into a potential conflict
of interest addressed in Hall is triggered when the district court either actually knows or
reasonably should known that an actual conflict of interest exists.

Hall, at 617-618.

However, when a defendant requests substitute counsel, the request alone triggers a
duty of inquiry even when the judge thinks the defendant is lying about the need for
appointment of substitute counsel.

As such, the State's reliance on Hall is entirely

misplaced because Ms. Bates affirmatively requested the appointment of substitute
counsel. 4
In sum, Ms. Bates requested the appointment of substitute counsel. The district
court erred when it denied that request without conducting the mandatory inquiry into

generally have competing interests. This concern is addressed in a comment to Idaho
Rule of Professional Conduct 1. 7, which states that "[t]he potential for conflict of interest
in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer
should decline to represent more than one codefendant." I.R.P.C. 1.7 cmt. 23.
4 However, upon remand, if the district court learns that there is a potential conflict of
interest between Ms. Bates and her trial counsel, then an affirmative duty of inquiry will
be triggered. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347.
9

Ms. Bates' request for substitute counsel. The State's argument that a district court has
no duty to inquire into a post-judgment request for substitute counsel completely
disregards the Idaho Supreme Court's holding that a statutory right to counsel is coextensive with a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Additionally, the Murphy holding is
not applicable to this case because Murphy addresses post-conviction proceedings
pursuant to the UPCA and this matter deals with a motion to withdraw a guilty plea in
the criminal proceedings.

Moreover, from a policy perspective, the notion that an

attorney need not be either competent or bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct
during post-judgment proceedings undermines the credibility of both the Idaho State Bar
and the legal professional as a whole. This in turn undermines the credibility of the
Idaho Judiciary, as it controls the minimal ethical standards required of attorneys
practicing in the State of Idaho. As such, Ms. Bates contends that it would be unwise to
extend the holding in Murphy, which is not yet final, to post-judgment criminal
proceedings.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Bates respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter with
instructions for the district court to inquire into Ms. Bates' request for substitute counsel.
Ms. Bates also requests that this Court remand this matter with instructions to allow
Ms. Bates to withdraw her guilty plea. Alternatively, Ms. Bates requests that this Court
reduce the fixed portion of her sentence from thirty years to either ten or fifteen years.
th

DATED this 10 day of June, 2014.

~
.c"/
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L V------i ;--·-

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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